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The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic has caused disruption to professional 
and recreational sports across the world.[1] The 
causal agent of COVID-19 is the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)[2], which 
is transmitted from human-to-human by multiple 
pathways.[3,4] The novelty of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and 
therefore population susceptibility, in addition to the high 
transmissibility of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, ultimately resulted 
in the COVID-19 pandemic.[5]  
Professional and recreational sports are obligated to 
implement risk management and mitigation strategies to 
prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission and the subsequent 
COVID-19 spread.[6,7] The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be 
transmitted by three main routes in sport; respiratory aerosol, 
droplets and fomites.[8,9] The risks of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
are influenced by the environment in which they occur (Fig. 1). 
All activities, from leaving home, including time spent within 
the sporting environment, and other associated activities (e.g. 
meetings and travel) should be considered as SARS-CoV-2 
transmission risks (Fig. 2).[10,11]  
The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the 
considerations of end-to-end SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk 
and practical steps for risk management within sport.  
 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission via respiratory aerosol and 
droplets 
 
The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be transmitted by larger 
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused disruption to professional and recreational sports across the 
world. The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be transmitted by relatively large respiratory droplets that behave ballistically, and exhaled 
aerosol droplets, which potentially pose a greater risk. This review provides a summary of end-to-end SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
risk factors for sport and an overview of transmission mechanisms to be considered by all stakeholders. The risk of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission is greatest indoors, and primarily influenced by the ventilation of the environment and the close proximity of 
individuals. The SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks outdoors, e.g. via water, and from fomites, appear less than initially thought. 
Mitigation strategies include good end-to-end scenario planning of activities to optimise physical distancing, face mask wearing 
and hygiene practice of individuals, the environment and equipment. The identification and removal of infectious individuals 
should be undertaken by means of the taking of temperature and COVID-19 symptom screening, and the use of diagnostic 
monitoring tests to identify asymptomatic individuals. Using adequate video footage, data from proximity technology and 
subject interviews, the identification and isolation of ‘close contacts’ should also be undertaken to limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
within sporting environments and into the wider community. Sports should aim to undertake activities outdoors where possible, 
given the lower SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk, in comparison to indoor environments. 
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respiratory droplets (>100 µm in diameter) that behave 
ballistically, and smaller exhaled aerosol droplets (<100 µm in 
diameter), which potentially pose a greater risk.[12-14] This is 
because aerosol droplets rapidly evaporate to become small 
aerosol particles (<50 µm in diameter)[15,16] that can easily be 
inhaled.[13,17] Furthermore, smaller aerosol droplets can travel 
much further than ballistic droplets on convection air currents. 
These smaller aerosol droplets pose both a ‘near-field’ and a 
‘far-field’ threat. Near-field refers to close proximity (e.g. 1–2 
m), and far-field is beyond 2 m. Near-field SARS-CoV-2 
transmission risks are caused by clouds of exhaled aerosol 
particles, potentially infecting individuals within close 
proximity. Far-field SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks occur 
primarily indoors when aerosol particles have been dispersed 
by air currents into the wider room space. The near-field 
transmission risks posed by large respiratory aerosol droplets 
can be mitigated by physical (or social) distancing, protective 
screens, and the use of face masks.[18,19] The far-field risks posed 
by smaller infectious aerosols must be countered either by 
ventilation which flushes airborne particles from the room 
space,[19] or potentially by air disinfection which biologically 
inactivates the SARS-CoV-2 virus.[20] In addition, thermal 
plumes, warm convection air currents that surround all 
individuals, appear to play an important role in the 
transportation of respiratory aerosols,[21] with exhaled fine 
aerosol particles rising vertically above the heads of 
individuals. Indoors, the aerosol particles entrained into 
thermal plumes become trapped by the ceiling and so get 
recirculated around the room space on convection currents 
and as such become a SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk within 
far-field zones. 
The transmission risk of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is far greater 
indoors than outdoors, primarily due to increased ventilation 
outdoors. Although near-field SARS-CoV-2 transmission can 
occur both indoors and outdoors,[22] in the outdoor 
environment the near-field transmission risk is lower because 
air velocities are generally higher, with the result that the 
exhaled aerosol particles will be dispersed more rapidly. This 
dispersion (dilution) effect becomes less pronounced the closer 
individuals are to each other. The risk of far-field aerosol 
transmission is much greater indoors because the 
concentration of aerosol particles in room spaces builds up 
over time, particularly in poorly ventilated spaces. The risk is 
further increased by aerosol particles, which are entrained in 
thermal plumes, trapped by the ceiling, before slowly 
descending through the breathing zone due to gravitational 
deposition. Outdoors, these are dispersed upward into the 
atmosphere, and therefore far-field aerosol transmission is 
unlikely outdoors given greater ventilation.[23]  
To determine the SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk, it is 
important to define indoor and outdoor environments. This 
can be challenging in sport due to covered outdoor spaces (e.g. 
‘indoor’ stadiums). Therefore, evaluating spaces based on 
near-field and far-field aerosol threat may be more 
appropriate. In a poorly ventilated communal changing area, 
both the near-field and far-field threats will be significant, 
whereas in a large indoor training facility with no ceiling and 
a high roof space, the far-field aerosol threat will be much less. 
This is due to the greater volume of the space, thus reduced 
concentration of SARS-CoV-2 viral particles potentially 
inhaled over time. If air movement at low level is poor (i.e. low 
air velocities) then the near-field threat may still be high, 
therefore physical distancing and mask wearing could be 
beneficial. Many larger indoor sporting facilities (i.e. arenas) 
normally contain audiences, in which case, because of the high 
numbers of people involved, this may result in air and 
ventilation characteristics behaving similar to an indoor space 
for COVID-19 risk assessment purposes. 
The risk posed by far-field aerosol transmission of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus can be mitigated through improved room 
ventilation (e.g. opening windows and doors).[24,25] It has been 
shown that the SARS-CoV-2 virus survives in aerosols for 
longer when the air is cooler and drier.[21,26] The viral half-life 
is >10 times longer outdoors during the winter and autumn 
months compared with the summer.[25] Even though a room 
space may be heated in winter, the air can still be very dry (e.g. 
10-40% relative humidity). The viral load in any droplets 
inhaled may be substantially greater than would be the case 
during the summer months.[25] While the implications of this 
are not yet fully understood, it may explain in part the seasonal 
variation in COVID-19 case numbers that have been observed 
in many temperate regions. UVB radiation in sunlight has also 
been shown to rapidly degrade the virus. Consequently, 
COVID-19 appears to have a seasonal component,[27] with 
transmission greatly reduced during the summer months 
when temperatures and UVB levels are higher and the air is 
more humid. 
The probability that far-field transmission events will occur 
can be determined from the Wells-Riley equation (Equation 
1).[28] The probability of acquiring an infection by the airborne 
route increases as: (i) the number of infectious people present 
increases; (ii) the quanta generation rate increases; and (iii) the 
number of people susceptible spend longer in the presence of 
infectious people. The quanta generation rate, q, cannot be 
obtained directly, but rather, must be estimated 
epidemiologically from outbreak data. With respect to this, a 
Fig. 1. SARS-CoV-2 main transmission routes and risks for sport 
 
 REVIEW                                                                                                                                                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
3    SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021 
 
quantum of infection is defined as the infectious dose required 






Where: C is the number of new infection cases; S is the number 
of susceptible individuals; I is the number of infectors; p is the 
average pulmonary ventilation rate of a person (m3/s); q is the 
quanta generation rate of the infectious agent (quanta/s); t is 
the exposure time (s), and Q is the room ventilation rate with 
clean outside air (m3/s).  
To reduce the SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk by the aerosol 
route in any given context, it is important to minimise the 
number of people present and the duration of exposure, and 
maximise the room ventilation rates so that the concentration 
of infectious particles in the air is reduced.[29-30] It is not always 
easy to determine room ventilation rates, particularly in 
situations where natural ventilation is employed. Therefore, 
monitoring carbon dioxide (CO2) can be used as a surrogate 
measure for ventilation in the Wells-Riley model.[31]    
 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission via fomites 
Fomites may contribute to the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. 
High viral loads of SARS-CoV-2 have been shown to remain 
viable for up to 72 hours on inert surfaces, whilst undergoing 
exponential decay.[32] Viral decay in culture media is increased 
at higher temperatures, with the virus remaining infectious for 
seven days at 22oC, one day at 37oC and 30 minutes at 56oC.[33] 
Temperature is therefore likely to be a key determinant of 
surface stability. As equipment is commonly shared in 
numerous sports, this does potentially pose a route of 
transmission,[34,35] although the likelihood of transferring a 
sufficient amount of the virus to cause an infection to the 
mucus membranes of another person remains unclear.[34] Viral 
shedding into the environment has been demonstrated during 
SARS-CoV-2 infection. The rooms of hospitalised SARS-CoV-
2 patients can be heavily contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 
RNA, including frequently touched surfaces, such as sinks and 
door handles.[36] The transfer of SARS-CoV-2 RNA from the 
hands of patients to objects has also been documented, 
demonstrating the environmental contamination originating 
from infectious individuals.[37]  However, most studies have 
utilised quantitative reverse transcription polymerase chain 
reaction (RT-qPCR) to detect SARS-CoV-2 ribonucleic acid 
(RNA) in the environment, rather than demonstrating 
infectious viral particles using culture. A study of 
environmental SARS-CoV-2 in the rooms of quarantining 
confirmed positive cases found 29/55 surfaces in the rooms of 
symptomatic cases were positive for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-
qPCR; however, no viable virus was isolated in cell culture.[38] 
As such, the contribution of fomites to the transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 is controversial,[39] and remains relatively 
unknown,[25] in part due to no minimum infectious dose of 
SARS-CoV-2 being established,[40] hampering studies of 
transmission dynamics from surfaces. 
The risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission via saliva, due to the 
potential to carry high viral loads,[41] is significant. The risk is 
greater in sports where spitting is common practice (e.g. in 
cricket, saliva is often used to shine cricket balls, potentially 
facilitating the deposition of viral particles from infected 
players). RNA from an inactivated SARS-CoV-2 virus can be 
detected from the surface of cricket balls up to one hour post-
inoculation using RT-qPCR, although viral viability (i.e. the 
ability to cause infection) cannot be determined using this 
approach.[35] Using live SARS-CoV-2 viruses, an exponential 
reduction in detectable SARS-CoV-2 virions for all inoculated 
sport equipment (i.e. cricket glove, football, golf ball, horse 
saddle, rugby ball, tennis ball, gym pit foam) was observed 
over a short-term period (one minute to 90 minutes).[34] The 
low inoculum (5.4x102 virions, representing a 40µl saliva 
droplet from a SARS-CoV-2 infected player with a viral load in 
the lower quartile of cases) was only detectable on one (the 
polyurethane horse racing saddle) of ten materials at five 
minutes and no virus could be detected on any material after 
15 minutes. These findings suggest that from individuals with 
lower viral loads, there is probably insufficient viral load 
transferred from fomites to be infectious. 
The material composition should also be considered when 
evaluating the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transfer on sports 
equipment. For example, Edwards et al.[34] found that viral 
recovery was reduced by absorbent materials, which included 
leather (e.g. red cricket ball and cricket glove) and 
polyurethane foam (e.g. gym mat foam). Harbourt et al.[42] also 
demonstrated that viral stability was reduced on absorbent 
clothing in comparison to skin or plastic materials. The 
observation that porous materials result in reduced viral 
recovery and transmission risk can be used to prioritise 
materials for within-game cleaning or swapping, and focus 
cleaning efforts to reduce their effect on sporting events.[34] In 
addition to the material composition of the sports equipment, 
the specific finish also appears important. For example, 
considering two bovine leather cricket balls, the ball that had 
synthetic grease on it had a lower viral recovery than the ball 
that had a nitrocellulose finish.[34] There is potential for this 
information to be used by developers of sporting materials to 
engineer products to be less amenable to viral transmission. 
The quantification of the viral load that may be transferred 
from an individual with a SARS-CoV-2 infection onto sports 
equipment has not been evaluated. Edwards et al.[34] used 
previously reported concentrations seen in respiratory tract 
secretions, although the concentrations may be different in 
practice. A quantitative microbial assessment of the risk of 
infection from fomites has been performed using the Monte 
Carlo simulation.[43] A lower than 1/10 000 infection risk was 
observed from a single touch of surfaces infected with a range 
of 1 to 10 000 genome copies/cm2.  This supports the potentially 
limited role of fomites in SARS-CoV-2 transmission, although 
further research is still required.  
 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission via water  
The transmission risk of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in water is an 
important consideration during the COVID-19 pandemic for 
sports. SARS-CoV-2 is an enveloped virus, similar to 
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(e.g. measles virus, mumps virus, respiratory syncytial virus), 
Herpesviridae, Coronaviridae (some with low pathogenicity, 
others with high pathogenicity like SARS-CoV and MERS-
CoV). Whilst influenza viruses and coronaviruses can be 
found in trace amounts in faecal material and aqueous 
environments, waterborne infections have not been 
recorded.[44-46] Coronaviruses may be introduced into aquatic 
habitats through urban or agricultural runoff or via 
wastewater effluents, as observed in lake, river and coastal 
waters.[47-49] These viral units are likely to experience 
considerable decay and loss of infectivity rapidly after arriving 
in water.[50]  
Several factors can influence virus survival, vitality and 
infectious capability in water, which include temperature, 
presence of suspended solid and organic matter, pH, and 
water treatments and disinfections.[51] RNA fragments of the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus have not been detected in treated waters,[52] 
therefore, current water treatment practices are likely to be 
effective in virus removal. Therefore, water is not considered a 
major transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 for sports, due to the 
instability of water[53] and susceptibility to oxidants, such as 
chlorine.[54]  
 
Transmission risk management considerations for sporting 
activities 
 
Fig. 2 presents activities that should be considered as end-to-
end SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks within sport. A wider 
COVID-19 management system, including the identification, 
and removal of infectious and potentially infectious (e.g. 
individuals exposed to infectious individuals) should also 
form part of the overall SARS-CoV-2 risk 
mitigation strategy. 
 
Athlete medical and professional care  
 
Screening and testing for COVID-19 
The risk of the SARS-CoV-2 spreading 
within a sporting environment can be 
reduced by the implementation of 
appropriate COVID-19 protocols, which 
aim to identify and prevent symptomatic 
and asymptomatic individuals entering the 
environment. The primary symptoms  (e.g. 
loss of taste or smell, new or continuous 
cough, high temperature [>37.8oC], muscle 
aches and fatigue,[55]) can be monitored 
daily, and integrated within routine 
wellbeing types which are common in 
sport.[56] The effectiveness of temperature 
screening with non-contact thermometers, 
in isolation of other monitoring strategies, 
has recently been questioned.[57] Once 
symptomatic individuals are identified, 
they can then receive a consultation with a 
clinician, and/or be referred for appropriate 
SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic testing.  
Asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic 
individuals with COVID-19 can have high 
viral loads, similar to those with clinical disease, indicating 
that athletes without symptoms are able to transmit the SARS-
CoV-2 virus within a sporting environment.[58] Various SARS-
CoV-2 diagnostic testing protocols exist to identify 
symptomatic and pre-symptomatic individuals. The 
implementation of a testing programme would likely be 
influenced by both clinical reasoning, cost and logistical 
considerations. 
The most sensitive tests for acute SARS-CoV-2 infection are 
RT-qPCR assays, which amplify and detect specific sequences 
of the SARS-CoV-2 genome. Multiple commercial and 
approved (Food and Drug Administration [FDA], Conformitè 
Europëenne in vitro diagnostic medical devices [CE-IVD]) 
assays are available to target either single or multiplex regions 
of the SARS-CoV-2 genome.[59] Best performing assays can 
detect SARS-CoV-2 as low as 100 genome copies/mL.[60] RT-
qPCR testing requires complex infrastructure, undertaken in 
specialist laboratories. Cycle threshold (Ct) values provide a 
proxy measure of viral load in a RT-qPCR test, with values 
under 30 considered high and highly infectious, values 
between 30-40 low, and >40 negative.[61-63] Whilst the lack of a 
more accurate comparator test or ‘gold standard’ makes the 
true accuracy of RT-qPCR difficult to ascertain,[64] sensitivity is 
thought to range between 70% and 98%, depending on sample 
type, gene target, and kit manufacturer.[65-66] The specificity of 
RT-qPCR is high, with large studies estimating it to lie between 
97.4 and 99.1%.[67]  
Whilst RT-qPCR provides a high level of sensitivity, the 
duration of time from swab to results (e.g. transit to, and 
processing within a laboratory) and the high commercial cost 
Fig. 2. End-to-end transmission risk activities for sports 
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(approx. £100 GBP / $140 USD if purchased in United Kingdom 
(UK) or R830 ZAR / $60 USD if purchased in South Africa) 
means that other diagnostic tests may be preferable. Lateral 
flow tests (LFT) are an alternative valid, point-of-care 
diagnostic tool that can detect individuals with high viral 
loads, within approximately 15 minutes from swab to test 
outcome.[68] The cost per LFT test is approximately £5 GBP if 
purchased in UK (approx. $7 USD) or approximately R208 
ZAR if purchased in South Africa (approx. $15 USD), 
significantly less than a RT-qPCR test. In independent 
evaluations (World Health Organisation Emergency Use 
Listing; WHO-EUL) approved tests have >80% sensitivity 
rising to >95% sensitivity in individuals with high viral load 
(Ct <30) and >98% specificity, although this can vary according 
to manufacturer.[69] Sampling technique is important, given 
when swabs are self-taken and read by non-professionals, the 
sensitivity may be as low as 40%.[70] As such, the 
implementation of LFT within sports requires careful planning 
and appropriate training of any staff taking swabs. 
LFT will not capture all positive cases (due to inability to 
detect low viral loads) but may be appropriate as part of an 
asymptomatic monitoring strategy. If one positive LFT is 
detected within a cohort during routine LFT asymptomatic 
monitoring, this can be used as a trigger for a surge in daily 
testing or for the RT-qPCR testing of individuals or whole 
squads. Furthermore, the sample collection to result duration 
for SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic tests may also be a consideration 
for sports. Even though RT-qPCR has a higher sensitivity than 
LFT, the longer sample collection to result duration (15 mins 
vs. approx. 24-36 hrs) may mean that asymptomatic infectious 
individuals inadvertently remain within the sporting 
environment if athletes are training daily. 
Alternative assays exist, including real-time loop mediated 
isothermal amplification (LAMP) technology, where swab and 
saliva samples can be used with minimal processing and 
extensive laboratory facilities are not required. The typical 
time to run this diagnostic test is approximately 20 minutes, 
from sample collection to result.[71] Tests undertaken using 
LAMP technology still require molecular expertise, are not 
truly point-of-care, and the cost reflects the personnel and 
equipment required to perform them. In the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR)-funded evaluation, LAMP testing 
was 79% sensitive on asymptomatic individuals and 100% 
specific, although it missed more than 50% of cases in a 
Manchester, UK pilot.[71] There seems to be little, if any, 
increase in sensitivity from LFTs to these simplified molecular 
tools with no extraction, yet they are more complex and 
expensive to implement.  
To avoid false positives results, it may be recommended that 
individuals who have previously tested positive for SARS-
CoV-2 are removed from the testing programme for 90 days, 
due to residual RNA remnants following SARS-CoV-2 acute 
infection. Re-infection is unlikely in the 90 days following an 
infection,[72] although the evidence still remains unclear.[73] The 
rollout of vaccination programmes around the world presents 
a new challenge for the management of athletes.[74] At present, 
it is unclear how athletes should be managed within routine 
diagnostic testing cycles once vaccinated for the SARS-CoV-2 
virus. Most vaccination regimens are using two doses to first 
prime, and then boost immunity.[75] A level of protection is 
gained from the first vaccination, with a trial of the Pfizer-
BioNTech BNT162b2 mRNA COVID-19 vaccine showing 52% 
efficacy after the first dose.[76] Breakout infections following 
full vaccination are less severe and likely to be less 
transmissible.[77,78] There is speculation that vaccinated 
individuals may still asymptomatically carry SARS-CoV-2 and 
contribute to its transmission,[79] although data are lacking in 
this area and will become available via surveillance studies of 
vaccinated populations. 
When determining the appropriateness of a diagnostic test 
for a specific cohort, it is important to also consider the 
community prevalence of COVID-19.[80] As the prevalence 
declines, the positive predictive value also declines 
exponentially. Even with a diagnostic test with high sensitivity 
and specificity, at low population prevalence the results may 
be false positives, as the positive predictive value becomes 
small.[67] As such, diagnostic testing should be one part of the 
overall COVID-19 risk management measures. 
 
Providing safe medical and professional care 
The near-field and far-field transmission risk of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus must be carefully considered in the delivery of 
safe medical and professional care to athletes in sport. Athletes 
are supported by large multidisciplinary teams, consisting of 
doctors, physiotherapists, nutritionists, psychologists, and 
masseurs, among others. Determining what care can be safely 
delivered remotely through telemedicine is the most effective 
means of mitigating any transmission risk.[81] However, certain 
situations can only be conducted ‘face-to-face’ and 
consequently this increases potential SARS-CoV-2 exposure 
between individuals at close proximity. Care deemed 
necessary and essential, such as supervised rehabilitation, 
medical examinations and procedures, must be permitted in a 
risk-mitigated manner.[82,83] Delayed or compromised care 
could negatively impact an athlete’s wellbeing and sporting 
performance both in the short and longer term, which may 
result in prolonged recovery, disablement, and impact a future 
career opportunity.  
Pre-scenario planning most effectively mitigates the SARS-
CoV-2 transmission risk. Reducing the duration and frequency 
of interactions can be effective, as clinical environments tend 
to be specialised and not easily relocated to optimise 
environmental conditions. National healthcare guidance on 
personal protective equipment (PPE) has been interpreted for 
the sporting setting, taking into account the sport-specific 
nature, including delivery of pitch-side medical care (Table 
1),[84,85] with the recommendation that athlete patients also 
wear a face covering for the duration of review.[82]  Safe and 
effective use of PPE is founded on good training to ensure it is 
worn correctly and the risk of self-contamination is minimised 
during application and removal (donning and doffing). 
Importantly, for those not of an allied healthcare care 
profession, in the absence of appropriate training, high grade 
(i.e., Level 3) PPE is of no more protection than a simple face 
covering. All equipment, including PPE, should be single use 
where possible and, if reusable, subject to appropriate
                                                                                                                                             REVIEW                                                                                                                           
 
                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                      
  SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021       6 
 
sanitisation protocols. 
Verbal components of consultations should be conducted 
with physical distancing respected, breaching this only when 
essential for examinations and other procedures. Aerosol-
generating procedures (Table 2) can be a significant source of 
virus transmission when conducted on infectious individuals, 
due to the aerosolisation of respiratory droplets.[8] 
Consequently, these situations require a higher level of 
mitigation, through increasing the standard of PPE, and also 
the need for a dedicated area to limit the exposure to 
bystanders, which must be subject to appropriate 
decontamination after use.[84]  
Establishing a sport-specific injury risk profile can help 
provide COVID-19 safe updates to emergency action plans 
and thus ensure adequate equipment is available to account 
for PPE availability and sanitisation protocols for equipment 
between uses. Emergency care poses the greatest challenge, 
due to the need for a rapid response and propensity for these 
scenarios to involve aerosol-generating procedures. This can 
include head injuries which carries the potential for airway 
compromise and cardiac arrest. Both airway intervention and 
chest compressions are deemed potential aerosol-generating 
procedures.[86] Level 3 PPE can take some time to apply, which 
impacts on the ability for the medical response team to rapidly 
respond. Depending on resource availability and staff 
familiarity with donning and doffing, organisations may wish 
to have staff already prepared in Level 3 PPE for high-risk 
settings in order to prevent any unnecessary delay in 
delivering prompt emergency care.[84,85] In circumstances 
where only Level 2 PPE is available, or there is a delay in 
donning Level 3 PPE, airway interventions beyond simple 
manoeuvres are not recommended. In cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR), chest compressions can be commenced in 
addition to the use of an automated external defibrillator, 
provided that a face covering is applied to the casualty which 
does not impede airflow (i.e. oxygen mask or light cloth). In 
youth sport, where cardiac arrest can more commonly be 
triggered by a respiratory cause,[87] ventilation is crucial to 
survival. Medical teams should discuss how they wish to 
manage this situation, as a delay could severely impact clinical 
outcomes for the casualty. Outside of elite sports protocols, it 
may be decided that full CPR will be started in the absence of 
suitable PPE, at a risk to the responders. However, staff should 
not be put under undue pressure to compromise their own 
health and safety in the absence of adequate PPE.  
 
Training and competition 
Transmission risk during outdoor sporting activities 
The transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 during outdoor sporting 
activities can be determined based on the proximity, duration 
of close proximity and whether individuals are directly facing 
each other.[7,88] These factors determine the risk of infectious 
respiratory aerosol and droplet particles transferred from 
Table 1. Recommended Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) guidance for specific clinical situations that may be encountered in the sporting 
environment [84,85] 
Medical and Professional Care Player Interaction PPE Level 
Maintaining physical distancing as advised; NO face-to-face contact risk 1 
NOT maintaining 2 m distance; WITH face-to-face contact risk 2 
Wound care, excluding oral / dental / nasal injuries 2 
Uncomplicated concussion evaluation e.g. head injury assessment 2 
Managing complex injuries, with no C-spine involvement e.g. isolated limb or joint injury  2 
Medical emergency WITHOUT potential for airway compromise  2 
Cardiac arrest* WITHOUT airway interventions therefore WITH face covered; Includes continuous compressions and 
automated external defibrillator use 
2 
Performing a nasopharyngeal swab  2 
Nasal and oral procedures, e.g. epistaxis and oral injuries   3 
Aerosol generating procedures  3 
Medical emergency WITH potential for airway compromise e.g. complicated head injury, choking** 3 
Cardiac arrest* – WITH airway intervention, therefore WITHOUT covered compressions 3 
*Cardiac arrest scenarios have both options of Level 2 and Level 3 PPE to accommodate for availability in different situations. **In cases of suspected choking, 
although Level 3 PPE provides the most appropriate protection, it is appreciated that an immediate life-saving intervention may be needed which may preclude 
donning of the extra garments. In these cases, Level 2 protection should be a minimum. 
 
 
Table 2. Interventions with the potential to be aerosol generating procedures 
Activity 
1. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)  
2. Airway management: any suction of upper airway, use of airway adjuncts and emergency surgical airway procedures  
3. Breathing management: any form of manual ventilation; bag-valve-mask ventilation using a viral filter is ideal, while mouth-to-mouth 
ventilation is not recommended  
4. Medical emergencies with altered levels of consciousness and a risk of comprising of the airways  are potentially aerosol-generating 
procedures 
5. Nose and throat procedures, such as managing nasal epistaxis or oral lacerations  
Note: Nebulising, high flow oxygen administration via facemask, nasopharyngeal swabbing and defibrillation are not considered aerosol generating procedures. 
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human-to-human. Outdoor team sports, which include a large 
number of prolonged close interactions, or encounters 
between athletes outdoors (e.g. start or end of a race) pose a 
potential risk for human-to-human SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 
Whilst SARS-CoV-2 transmission during close proximity 
prolonged interactions outdoors is plausible, to date there has 
not been any confirmed transmission observed in sport (e.g. 
rugby league and soccer), despite infectious players 
inadvertently participating.[10,89,90] During training and match 
play, it would be assumed that participants have an increased 
respiration rate due to the demands of exercise, and thus a 
substantial increase in aerosol expiration.[91] Deep exhalation 
causes a 4- to 6-fold increase in aerosol particle concentration, 
and rapid inhalation increases aerosol particle concentration 
by a further 2- to 3-fold.[92] Consequently, the physiological 
demands of training and match play increases the SARS-CoV-
2 transmission risk in comparison to rest, given the increased 
rate and concentration of infectious particles being expired. 
During most sporting activities outdoors, the environmental 
conditions will likely mitigate the risk of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission via expired infectious particles. The very high 
ventilation rates experienced outdoors, together with higher 
air velocities, will disperse and dilute the infectious respiratory 
aerosol particles, thus reducing their concentration prior to 
inhalation. The closer the proximity between individuals and 
the longer the duration of the close proximity interactions, the 
greater the transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2, even when 
outdoors.[7,93] Some outdoor sporting activities may create 
indoor-like environmental characteristics (e.g. low ventilation, 
poor air flow), and therefore may remain high risk for 
transmission.[88] For example, a team huddle, face-to-face 
wrestling action, or rugby scrum may reduce ventilation, and 
therefore respiratory aerosol and droplet particles may behave 
in a similar way to indoor interactions, thus increasing the 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk. However, to date, no SARS-
CoV-2 transmission has been reported during these activities. 
The outdoor transmission risk appears to be lower than first 
suggested, which has since been reflected in the modification 
of outdoor contact-tracing frameworks in sport.[7,88] Whilst the 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk during outdoor team sports 
appears to have been downgraded, the data available only 
provides a preliminary insight into the overall risk, given the 
small sample sizes within the respective studies.[10,89,90] For 
example, in rugby league, eight infectious players 
inadvertently participated in matches with 100 other 
players.[10] In the 14 days following the matches, five players 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 via RT-qPCR, although these 
positive cases were most likely traced to social interactions, car 
sharing and wider community transmission and were not 
linked to in-match transmission. 
In outdoor evasion team sports, the overall purpose is to 
avoid the opposition. Thus in some sports, this will mean that 
during the match close proximity interactions between players 
are rare and may only be fleeting in nature.[10] The greatest risk 
of SARS-CoV-2 transmission during outdoor sporting 
activities may be activities that are pre-match or proceed after 
that training activity, match or competition.[94] Close proximity 
conversations, drink breaks, and pre-match, post-match or 
celebratory huddles may pose the greatest risk of SARS-CoV-
2 transmission, and should therefore be considered within 
sports risk mitigation strategies for outdoor sport activities. 
 
Transmission risk during indoor sporting activities 
In addition to the aforementioned  outdoor risk factors (e.g. 
ventilation of space, duration of close proximity between 
individuals), further considerations in indoor training settings 
should be given to the increased breathing frequency and 
particle expiration, particularly with moderate to vigorous 
aerobic activities.[91,92,95] Activities associated with forced 
exhalation and deeper breathing have been shown to generate 
aerosol droplets that travel beyond 2 m,[96,97] extending the 
near-field transmission zone. The distance droplets and 
aerosols spread in the air can also be influenced by how an 
athlete moves within a space, given the risk of aerosol cloud 
formation within poorly ventilated spaces. Mitigation 
strategies to compensate this include increasing physical 
distancing beyond 2 m, positioning equipment so that people 
face away from each other, the use of screens, and avoiding 
loud background music (which requires individuals to shout 
to be heard, further increasing the generation of aerosols and 
droplets).  
The regulations on the use of face coverings in indoor 
settings vary between countries, and use during exercise is an 
area of debate.[98-101] It may provide some discomfort and 
sweating can result in the mask becoming damp, although the 
risk to the mask wearer appears minimal. Some indoor 
training activities may be more amenable for mask wearing 
(e.g. resistance training). Furthermore, if physical distancing is 
inadvertently and temporarily breached whilst moving 
around indoors, face coverings may provide a further 
mitigation strategy to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission. This may also help mitigate inadvertent high-
risk SARS-CoV-2 transmission situations (e.g. where people 
may congregate; entrances and exits, changing rooms and 
lockers, holding areas). Physical distancing, the wearing of 
face coverings by staff and athletes where possible, and 
avoiding talking to others during or immediately after exercise 
can help reduce the SARS-CoV2 transmission risk during 
indoor sporting activities.  
Fomite transmission should also be considered in relation to 
all surfaces, prioritising high-contact areas (e.g. drinking 
facilities, shared equipment, clothing). Sweat does not appear 
to be a transmission mechanism for SARS-CoV-2,[102] thus 
surface contamination would be via fomites, caused by 
infectious respiratory aerosol and droplets. Individual labelled 
drinks containers, clothing and towels, in addition to 
appropriate cleaning practices (e.g. paper towel, disinfectant 
spray and bins close to equipment, and clothing washed at a 
temperature of 60°C or above immediately after use) can help 
mitigate the SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk.  
 
Transmission risk during aquatic activities 
The potential transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 during aquatic 
activities is via transmission in water and expired aerosol and 
droplet transmission, linked to the proximity (and potential 
overcrowding) between individuals. The poor resistance of
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enveloped viruses, such as SARS-CoV-2, to disinfected waters 
explains the limited transmissibility of  this virus in water, 
regardless of the initial viral load.[103-105] Furthermore, warmer 
water temperatures (i.e. >20-30° C) inactivate the virus quicker 
than lower temperatures (i.e., 4° C),[106] and previous studies 
have suggested that some natural spa, waters may already 
have an intrinsic antibacterial activity due to their chemical 
and physical properties, as well as due to their resident 
microflora.[107-109] The presence of viruses in the water of 
swimming pools is directly linked with contamination by 
bathers that could release traces of biological fluids, such as 
saliva or nasal mucus droplets, vomit or faeces.[110,111] 
Pathogens and RNA fragments can be detected in recreational 
waters (e.g. swimming pools) for several reasons, including 
inadequate compliance with disinfection procedures and 
technical failures. However, the primary risk of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission between individuals remains via respiratory 
aerosols and droplets.[105,112]  
From a descriptive epidemiology perspective, the COVID-19 
pandemic affected people involved in very different 
occupational, recreational, or physical activities, but no 
outbreaks have been associated to swimming pools. Physical 
distancing, masks and handwashing remain the key issues for 
prevention, and the practice of swimming itself would not 
represent a major risk compared to other activities and 
environments. Both swimming pools and spa waters do not 
seem to constitute a specific risk, at least according to current 
epidemiological data.[105,112]  
The risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in water appears low, 
especially with the implementation of mitigation strategies. 
The SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk in aquatic sports appears 
linked to insufficient physical distancing whilst in swimming 
pools and spas, similar to other environments. Maintaining 
physical distancing, avoiding overcrowding by scheduling 
systems, and the implementation of a one-way system to avoid 
inadvertent clustering of individuals should be a priority. 
Similarly, optimising indoor ventilation and considering 
relative humidity and UV light (e.g. sunlight)[20,24] will 
collectively reduce the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 within 
swimming pools and similar environments. Associated 
activities (e.g. changing rooms, travel) may pose the greatest 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk for aquatic sports. Unique to 
aquatic sports is the need for changing room access (in 
comparison to soccer for example), therefore these SARS-CoV-
2 transmission risks should be considered, allowing similar 
risk mitigation strategies as other non-aquatic sports to be 
applied. 
 
Associated sporting activities 
Indoor meetings 
Within sports, indoor individual and team meetings 
potentially pose a significant risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 
Advice regarding SARS-CoV-2 transmission in educational 
settings is applicable to team meetings in sporting contexts. 
This can be broadly categorised as advice relating to near-field 
transmission (i.e. transmission via larger respiratory aerosol 
droplets and person-to-person contact), and far-field 
transmission (i.e. transmission via fine aerosol droplets that 
become truly airborne).   
For any team meeting, it is advisable that individuals are 
seated at least 1 m (preferably 2 m) apart in an arrangement 
that avoids face-to-face exposure (i.e. participants seated 
behind each other rather than face-to-face). It is also advisable 
that face masks should be worn indoors, even when physical 
distancing is practised.[18] This is not primarily to protect the 
wearers (although some limited protection appears to be 
afforded by wearing low-efficiency medical and cloth 
masks),[113] but rather because there is evidence that wearing 
even low-quality masks reduces the emissions of SARS-CoV-2 
virus-laden particles, both droplets and aerosols.[114,115] Face 
masks block the shedding of ballistic droplets and larger 
aerosols and reduce the shedding of smaller respirable 
aerosols.[114,116] While it can be argued that face coverings are 
not always necessary indoors when good physical distancing 
is exercised and spaces are well ventilated,[117] given the wider 
implications associated with an athlete contracting COVID-19 
(e.g. weakened teams, abandoned matches and tours), the 
wearing of face masks is recommended when attending 
meetings held indoors. 
The airflow within a room is of paramount importance. It has 
been calculated that under steady-state conditions, the 
airborne viral load may reach as high as 1 248 RNA copies/m3 
in a poorly ventilated room, simply due to the breathing by a 
super-emitter (Table 3).[118] In order to mitigate airborne (far-
field) transmission, it is necessary to ensure the room space is 
well ventilated with outside air (i.e. >10 L/s per person) to 
ensure CO2 levels are maintained below 1 000 ppm.[19,31] If 
room CO2 levels exceed this threshold, strategies to increase 
the ventilation rate should be adopted. If the space is 
mechanically ventilated, the amount of outside air delivered 
should be maximised and the recirculated air minimised.[19] 
Care should also be taken in buildings that employ centralised 
Table 3. COVID-19 R-numbers for a 1 400 m3 open-place office, occupied by 40 people for 8 hours each day, with a single pre/asymptomatic 





(4 L/s per person) 
Ventilation rate 
(10 L/s per person) 
Ventilation rate 
(20 L/s per person) 
Quiet desk work (low viral shedder) 0.3 0.25 0.13 0.07 
Quiet desk work (standard viral shedder) 1.0 0.84 0.42 0.24 
Talking sedentary 5.0 4.00 2.10 1.20 
Super-spreader (low) 20.0 14.00 7.60 4.40 
Super-spreader (high) 100.0 35.00 26.00 18.0 
The values presented in columns 3-5 above are the predicted R-values (i.e. the expected number of secondary COVID-19 infections arising from one infected person 
attending the office for 5 working days) for the specified ventilation rates. The quanta production rate associated with each activity scenario (column 1) is specified 
in column 2.  
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heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. In 
such systems, to save energy during the winter months, up to 
about 80% of the extracted room air (return air) can be 
recirculated, with the result that aerosols containing the SARS-
CoV-2 virus may be widely re-distributed around the 
building.[19] If this is the case and it is not possible to convert 
the system to a full ‘fresh air’ system, then it may be necessary 
to retrofit ultraviolet (UVC) lamps, with a wavelength of 254 
nm, into the return air ducts to disinfect the air and prevent 
recirculation of the virus.[19]  
Whilst in team meetings, SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk can 
be worsened if the infector is talking loudly or shouting / 
singing. With an average sputum viral load, it has been 
estimated that speaking in a loud voice for one minute will 
generate >1 000 virion-containing aerosols.[119] Therefore, 
theoretically a super-shedder, emitting a 100-fold higher viral 
load than average, could shed >100 000 virions in emitted 
droplets per minute of speaking.[120] Applying findings from 
other settings, outbreaks have been reported in: nightclubs,[14] 
religious gatherings,[121,122] choirs and singing events,[123] and 
weddings. All these settings involve a high density of 
individuals within confined spaces for considerable periods of 
time, with most involving singing or talking in order to be 
heard above the background noise. 
While the short range (near-field) risk posed by ballistic 
droplets >100 μm can be mitigated by physical distancing, 
screens, and the use of face masks[18,126] during team meetings, 
the longer range (far-field) threat posed by smaller infectious 
aerosols must be countered either by ventilation which flushes 
airborne particles from the room space, or by air disinfection 
which biologically inactivates the virus.[20] The effectiveness of 
air purifiers can be determined via Clean Air Delivery Rate 
(CADR). The CADR indicates how many cubic meters of 
cleaned air the air purifier provides per hour and thus 
corresponds to the product of filter efficiency and volume flow 
rate that the unit circulates. At a CADR of 750 m³/h, the risk of 
infection per hour of time spent in a room with an infected 
person has been proposed to be reduced to 10%.[127] Whilst the 
risk of infection is reduced, other mitigation strategies, such as 
ventilation and/or wearing masks, should also be 
implemented. Air purifiers can be used between meetings, 
which typically provide three to six air changes per hour, 
although higher air change values (e.g. 6) are recommended 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, to reduce the risk of 
infectious particles remaining within an environment.[127] 
Further considerations should also be made when the air is 
cooler and drier, given that it has been shown that the SARS-
CoV-2 virus survives in aerosols for considerably 
longer,[27,28,128] and the viral half-life is >10 times longer during 
the winter and autumn months compared with the summer.[25]  
 
Breaks and social interactions 
Similar to many other occupational settings, individuals in 
sport may have coffee and lunch breaks throughout the day. 
These breaks can become high SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk 
situations, due to multiple people congregating in one location 
(e.g. queuing in the canteen), touching the same object or 
surface (e.g. coffee machine), and people wanting to socialise 
and speak to each other whilst being less vigilant. This can be 
worsened by the fact that masks must be removed to eat and 
drink. It is therefore important to carefully consider how social 
breaks are managed, so as not to inadvertently undermine 
infection control measures taken elsewhere.  
Given the above, it is important to plan both spatially and 
temporally how social breaks are undertaken. This is 
particularly important when team meetings are held in shared 
facilities that might be occupied by other groups (e.g. sports 
centres). This also applies to the serving and eating of food, 
whereby buffet style meal serving will pose a greater risk of 
SARS-CoV-2 than table service, due to the risk of clustering 
and human-to-human interactions. Where possible, people 
should be encouraged to physically distance themselves, eat 
and drink outdoors, and wear face masks up until the point 
where food or drink is consumed. It may also be advantageous 
to stagger meal timings to avoid large groups being within 
shared spaces without masks for a period of time. If consuming 
food and drink outdoors is not possible, then the seating and 
tables should be arranged to facilitate physical distancing in a 
well-ventilated space.  
 
Travel and transportation 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission during travel poses a risk for elite 
sport, given that teams often travel in large groups both 
nationally and internationally. When planning travel 
arrangements, it is important to consider the mode of 
transport, required stops, and accommodation. In all 
situations, near-field risks can be mitigated via physically 
distancing, seating positions (e.g. seated behind, or side-by-
side, but not facing other travellers [129]), wearing face masks 
and minimising the unnecessary movement of individuals. 
During travel it is preferable that a distance of 2 m is 
maintained during the entire journey. This may also serve to 
reduce the density of people within a space [130] and also 
prohibit car sharing, due to the inability to maintain a physical 
distance of 2 m between individuals. 
When making travel plans, it is important to consider the 
prevalence of COVID-19 in the destination population, as this 
will influence the likelihood of an interaction with an 
infectious native individual.[80] If the prevalence is high, extra 
precautions may be required, including bubbling the athletic 
group, as there will be a much greater chance of interactions 
occurring with hotel staff, officials and other support or service 
staff. This group may also benefit from routine screening 
protocols, which may include symptom monitoring, and daily 
SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic testing. 
Travel on commercial public transport vehicles introduces a 
higher level of SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk exposure than 
travelling on a privately chartered vehicle, due to potential 
interactions with unmonitored individuals. Chartered 
transport may not always be possible due to financial 
constraints. Therefore, it is advisable to keep records of 
designated named seating plans. During the journey, 
movement around and conversation should be avoided with 
travellers.[129] The wearing of face masks will afford some 
protection to the wearer and prevent the dispersion of large 
respiratory droplets that could impact other travellers.[116] 
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Limiting unnecessary travel breaks, and time spent at potential 
‘infection hubs’ (e.g. shared spaces within airports, such as 
passport control and security screening, train stations, and 
motorway service stations) is advisable throughout a journey. 
This ensures that the group interacts with fewer external 
environments and individuals. Journeys should be kept as 
short as possible in order to minimise overall risk to all 
involved.      
The far-field transmission risk is dictated largely by the 
ventilation characteristics of the particular passenger vehicle 
in question. In cars and older style buses and trains, it is 
possible to open the windows to promote ventilation. Newer 
buses (coaches) and train carriages are typically hermetically 
sealed, and tend to overheat, especially in direct sunlight. As 
such they require mechanical cooling (air conditioning) and 
ventilation. This, however, consumes a considerable amount 
of energy,[131] with the result that manufacturers and operators 
tend to recirculate most of the air and minimise the amount of 
‘fresh’ outdoor air that is supplied to the carriages.[132] CO2 
concentrations >1 800 ppm[132-134] and as high as 5 525 ppm[135] 
have been recorded on urban railway carriages during peak 
periods (CO2 concentrations in well-ventilated spaces are 
generally <1 000 ppm).[19,31] This suggests that during periods 
of high occupancy, ventilation rates in passenger carriages are 
frequently inadequate to protect passengers from far-field 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Given this, it is advisable for 
athletes to travel in a significantly reduced occupancy, which 
will also be a by-product of physical distancing measures.  
Unlike trains and coaches, the air conditioning systems in 
aircraft cabins are generally fitted with high-efficiency 
particulate air (HEPA) filters which are highly effective at 
removing viral particles from recirculated air,[11] keeping the 
supply clean and free of pathogens. They also allow a high air 
change rate to be maintained in the cabin space, which is much 
higher than would be normally found in buildings. Few cases 
of COVID-19 transmission have thus far been reported.[11,136] 
HEPA filters make travelling in aircrafts less risky compared 
with other forms of transport with poorer ventilation 
properties. Nevertheless, transmission events have occurred 
on long-haul flights [137] and therefore it is advisable to continue 
with good behavioural standards during flights.[11]  
One strategy that is often employed during periods of travel 
(including tournaments) to reduce the risk of infection is 
cohorting,[138] which in effect creates small ‘bubbles’, beyond 
which an infection cannot proceed.[129] In the context of travel, 
this might involve breaking the travelling party into smaller 
sub-groups (cohorts), so that each person interacts with only a 
few others.[129] The formation of ‘travel bubbles’ greatly 
reduces connectivity of the whole travel party, thus reducing 
the risk of SARS-CoV-2 exposure, and an individual from 
contracting COVID-19, thus inhibiting the spread of the 
disease, and minimising the number of contacts identified who 
require isolation. This useful strategy may be expanded to 
camps and tournaments, where long stays are required in 
hotels and other types of accommodation. In this situation, 
enhanced protocols are required for the duration of the ‘travel 
bubble’ to prevent SARS-CoV-2 spreading within the group. 
This could also be extended to cover seating arrangements at 
meals, etc. Additionally, the ‘travel bubble’ should limit the 
interaction with others from outside of this cohort (e.g. 
waiters), and have strict entry criteria should the cohort need 
to be expanded (e.g. new players or an additional service 
added). Given the 14-day SARS-CoV-2 virus cycle, groups of 
athletes (and associated staff) should ensure that they follow a 
quarantine period for this duration of time, prior to becoming 
a ‘true bubble’, whereby physical distancing is not required, 
due to the cohort being confirmed as not infectious or infected 
with SARS-CoV-2. Within this bubble, no interaction should 
take place with individuals from outside of this group (e.g. 
family or friends) to ensure that the virus cannot enter the 
group. 
 
Transmission risk from spectators and media to sports staff 
and athletes 
Risks from spectators, media and event staff is best understood 
by considering an event as a gathering comprising all present. 
Where physical distancing is breached, outdoors or indoors, 
four risk factors have been identified. These are, the size of 
gathering, the density (at the macro-level, this is a measure for 
the whole gathering [number of people in a given space], at the 
micro level this can be interpreted as proximity or distance 
between individuals), the duration (both overall time at the 
gathering, or time spent in any particular interaction as part of 
the gathering), and the extent of circulation within the 
gathering.[130] This can be concurrently managed to mitigate 
each other in relation to community prevalence. In addition to 
the increased indoor transmission risk, an ‘indoor crowding 
effect’ has also been observed, where people naturally gather 
closer together.[130,139,140] SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic testing of 
media or other personnel prior to athlete interacts (e.g. 
interviews) can be also used to reduce the SARS-CoV-2 
transmission risk.   
SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk for an event can be calculated 
based on community prevalence, event attendance, and the 
theoretical assumption that 50% of infected individuals are 
asymptomatic and presymptomatic. Consequently, if 
community infection is 4 in 1 000, 2 are aware they are 
infectious (e.g. symptomatic) and therefore would not attend, 
for a gathering of 10 000 people, 20 infectious individuals may 
be unknowingly present within the crowd. This risk can by 
reduced via an increase in mass asymptomatic testing of the 
community. 
If the four identified mitigatable risks (size of gathering, 
density, duration, circulation) are applied to each fixture, the 
risk can be understood.[130] For example, a Premiership soccer 
match is a large gathering, but with allocated seats, meaning 
the density is known, and the potential duration and 
circulation between the spectators and the group of athletes 
can be managed. At a ‘Sunday League’ fixture, despite being a 
smaller gathering, the SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk to the 
group of athletes may be greater, given that spectators are 
typically not in allocated seats, can circulate freely, and have 
the potential to become within close proximity of athletes. 
Some events (e.g. snooker, swimming) traditionally involve 
athletes being within closer proximity to spectators due to 
venue characteristics, which are also indoors.  
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Overall system to mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
within sport 
 
This review presents a summary of end-to-end SARS-CoV-2 
transmission risk considerations for sport, providing an 
overview of transmission mechanisms and risks within 
specific scenarios and situations that are common for sport. 
Sports should aim to identify and reduce the chance of 
infectious individuals entering the environment, and then 
quantify and mitigate higher risk situations to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 should an infectious individual enter the 
environment. The likelihood of this occurring increases during 
periods of high community COVID-19 prevalence, given the 
significant association observed between new weekly cases of 
COVID-19 in the community and professional rugby.[80]  
Despite intensive monitoring and mitigation strategies, 
infectious individuals may still inadvertently enter the 
sporting environment. The identification and isolation of 
players and staff in elite sport should be undertaken with 
appropriate precision to prevent infected individuals 
remaining in the environment (e.g. resulting in potential virus 
transmission), and preventing low-risk contacts having to 
isolate, which potentially increases the risk of injury when 
returning. In addition, isolation may result in psychological 
strain, as well as causing wider disruption to competitions. 
Therefore, sports are required to identify individuals who 
have potentially been exposed to the virus and are 
subsequently required to isolate. This can be a challenging if 
national government guidelines have not been developed for 
sports.  
In addition to COVID-19’s specific protocols, the availability 
and sharing of video footage or human-to-human proximity 
data and subject interview, allows accurate close contact 
identification once a SARS-CoV-2 positive case is found. Sport-
specific contact tracing frameworks have been previously 
proposed (e.g. Team Sport Risk Exposure Framework (TS-
REF),[7] which has been used to identify increased risk sporting 
activities and to identify and isolate increased risk contacts 
during sporting activities.[10]  
The TS-REF has been applied to rugby league match 
activities (Fig. 3a), which were consequently assigned a rating 
of ‘increased, medium or low risk’. This identified tackles and 
scrums as increased risk activities (Fig. 3b). Rule and player 
behaviour interventions were then developed and 
implemented to reduce the relative risk of rugby league match 
play from a SARS-CoV-2 transmission perspective (Fig. 3c). As 
a consequence, rugby league in England temporarily removed 
Fig. 3. (a) A list of rugby league game-specific actions, (b) Application of Team Sport Risk Exposure Framework (TS-REF)[7], (c) Rugby 
league game-specific actions following potential risk-reduction interventions 
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scrums during the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce the potential 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk. This also reduced the number 
of players that would have been required to isolate due to their 
involvement in increased risk activities, should an infectious 
player inadvertently participate in a match.  
The TS-REF has more recently been updated (The Team 
Sport Risk Exposure Framework 2; TS-REF-2, Fig. 4) to address 
the increased SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks indoors 
compared with outdoors. Guidance on practically determining 
indoor and outdoor environments has been proposed, which 
considers if the space has a roof, the air velocity at low levels, 
the volume of the space and density of people in the area, 
environmental conditions and CO2 concentration.[88] In 
addition to government contact tracing guidelines, the sport-
specific frameworks may further support the identification of 
close contacts within a sporting environment, helping to 




This review provides a summary of end-to-end SARS-CoV-2 
transmission risk factors for sport and an overview of 
transmission mechanisms to be considered by all stakeholders. 
The risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission is greatest indoors, and 
primarily influenced by the ventilation of the environment and 
(close) proximity of the individuals. The SARS-CoV-2 
transmission risk outdoors, via water and from fomites, 
appears less than initially thought. Mitigation strategies 
include comprehensive end-to-end scenario planning of 
activities to optimise physical distancing, mask wearing and 
hygiene practice (for individuals, environment and 
equipment). The identification and removal of infectious 
individuals and their close contacts should be undertaken with 
appropriate precision to prevent further transmission. Sports 
should aim to undertake activities outdoors where possible, 
given the lower SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk, in comparison 
to indoor environments. Finally, the risk mitigation strategies 
presented may be applicable beyond the COVID-19 pandemic 
to reduce the risk of virus transmission in sport. 
 
Author contributions:  
BJ, GP, MJC, SPK, KAS, CB conceptualised the review. BJ, GP 
drafted the introduction, sections on SARS-CoV-2 
transmission during outdoor sports activities and the overall 
risk mitigation section. FV, LB, VRP drafted the sections on 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in water. TE, ERA drafted the 
sections on SARS-CoV-2 fomite transmission and screening. 
RJC, CD, AJ drafted the sections on SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
during indoor sports activities. GP, LH, JP drafted the sections 
on providing safe medical care. MW drafted the section on 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission with spectators and media. CB 
drafted the sections on SARS-CoV-2 transmission mechanisms 
and transmission risks during associated sporting activities. 
Fig. 4. The Team Sport Risk Exposure Framework 2; TS-REF-2 to identify increased risk contacts in sport [88]  
 
 REVIEW                                                                                                                                                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
13    SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021 
 




1. Stokes KA, Jones B, Bennett M, et al. Returning to play after 
prolonged training restrictions in professional collision sports. 
Int J Sports Med 2020;41(13):895-911. [doi: 10.1055/a-1180-3692] 
[PMID: 32483768]  
2. Coronaviridae Study Group of the International Committee on 
Taxonomy of Viruses. The species Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome-related coronavirus: classifying 2019-nCoV and naming 
it SARS-CoV-2. Nat Microbiol 2020; 5(4):536-544. [doi: 
10.1038/s41564-020-0695-z] [PMID: 32123347]  
3. Jayaweera M, Perera H, Gunawardana B, et al. Transmission of 
COVID-19 virus by droplets and aerosols: A critical review on 
the unresolved dichotomy. Environ Res 2020;188:109819. [doi: 
10.1016/j.envres.2020.109819] [PMID: 32569870] 
4. Wang J, Du G. COVID-19 may transmit through aerosol. Ir J Med 
Sci 2020;189(4):1143-1144. [doi: 10.1007/s11845-020-02218-2] 
[PMID: 32212099] 
5. Wang H, Li X, Li T, et al. The genetic sequence, origin, and 
diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis 
2020;39(9):1629-1635. [doi: 10.1007/s10096-020-03899-4] [PMID: 
32333222] 
6. Kemp S, Cowie CM, Gillett M, et al. Sports medicine leaders 
working with government and public health to plan a ‘return-
to-sport’ during the COVID-19 pandemic: the UK’s collaborative 
five-stage model for elite sport. Br J Sports Med 2021;55(1):4-5. 
[doi: 10.1136/bjsports-2020-102834] [PMID: 32661129] 
7. Jones B, Phillips G, Kemp SP, et al. A team sport risk exposure 
framework to support the return to sport. Br J Sports Med 2020. 
[https://blogs.bmj.com/bjsm/2020/07/01/a-team-sport-risk-
exposure-framework-to-support-the-return-to-sport] (accessed 
9 September 2020) 
8. Anderson EL, Turnham P, Griffin JR, et al. Consideration of the 
aerosol transmission for COVID-19 and public health. Risk Anal 
2020;40(5):902-907. [doi: 10.1111/risa.13500] [PMID: 32356927] 
9. Morawska L, Cao J. Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: The 
world should face the reality. Environ Int 2020;139:105730. [doi: 
10.1016/j.envint.2020.105730] [PMID: 32294574] 
10. Jones B, Phillips G, Kemp S, et al. SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
during rugby league matches: do players become infected after 
participating with SARS-CoV-2 positive players? Br J Sports 
Med 2021;55(4):807-813. [doi: 10.1136/bjsports-2020-103714] 
[PMID: 33574043] 
11. Pombal R, Hosegood I, Powell D. Risk of COVID-19 during air 
travel. JAMA 2020;324(17):1798. [doi: 10.1001/jama.2020.19108] 
[PMID: 33022035] 
12. Tang JW, Bahnfleth WP, Bluyssen PM, et al. Dismantling myths 
on the airborne transmission of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). J Hosp Infect 
2021;110:89-96. [doi: 10.1016/j/jhin.2020.12.022] [PMID: 
33453351]  
13. Tang JW, Marr LC, Li Y, et al. Covid-19 has redefined airborne 
transmission. BMJ 2021; 373:n913. [doi: 10.1136/bmj.n913] 
[PMID: 33853842] 
14. Greenhalgh T, Jimenez JL, Prather KA, et al. Ten scientific 
reasons in support of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. 
Lancet 2021;397(10285):1603–1605. [doi:10.1016/S0140-
6736(21)00869-2] [PMID: 33865497] 
15. Nicas M, Nazaroff WW, Hubbard A. Toward understanding the 
risk of secondary airborne infection: emission of respirable 
pathogens. J Occup Environ Hyg 2005;2(3):143–154. [doi: 
10.1080/15459620590918466] [PMID: 15764538]  
16. Marr LC, Tang JW, Van Mullekom J, et al. Mechanistic insights 
into the effect of humidity on airborne influenza virus survival, 
transmission and incidence. J R Soc Interface 2019; 16:20180298. 
[doi: 10.1098/rsif.2018.0298] [PMID: 30958176] 
17. Lindsley WG, Noti JD, Blachere FM, et al. Efficacy of face shields 
against cough aerosol droplets from a cough simulator. J Occup 
Environ Hyg 2014;11(8):509–518.  
[doi: 10.1080/15459624.2013.877591] [PMID: 24467190] 
18. Chu DK, Akl EA, Duda S, et al. Physical distancing, face masks, 
and eye protection to prevent person-to-person transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19: a systematic review and meta-
analysis. Lancet 2020;395(10242):1973–1987. [doi: 10.1016/S0140-
6736(20)31142-9] [PMID: 32497510] 
19. Burridge HC, Bhagat RK, Stettler MEJ, et al. The ventilation of 
buildings and other mitigating measures for COVID-19: a focus 
on wintertime. Proc R Soc A 2021;477(2247):20200855. [doi: 
10.1098/rspa.2020.0855] 
20. Beggs CB, Avital EJ. Upper-room ultraviolet air disinfection 
might help to reduce COVID-19 transmission in buildings: a 
feasibility study. PeerJ 2020;8:e10196. [doi:10.7717/peerj.10196] 
[PMID: 33083158] 
21. Bhagat RK, Wykes MS, Dalziel SB, et al. Effects of ventilation on 
the indoor spread of COVID-19. J Fluid Mech 2020;903:F1. [doi: 
10.1017/jfm.2020.720]  
22. Mittal R, Meneveau C, Wu W. A mathematical framework for 
estimating risk of airborne transmission of COVID-19 with 
application to face mask use and social distancing. Phys Fluids 
2020 1;32(10):101903. [doi: 10.1063/5.0025476] [PMID: 33100806] 
23. Beggs CB. Evaluation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus transmission 
risks associated with parkruns in England. Queen Mary 
University of London report for Parkrun Global Limited. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1a6m5W7WXCtBjjXBRWNhuQ
Q-_VKbNzoNl/view (Accessed 19th April 2021)  
24. Dabisch P, Schuit M, Herzog A, et al. The influence of 
temperature, humidity, and simulated sunlight on the infectivity 
of SARS-CoV-2 in aerosols. Aerosol Sci Technol 2021;55(2):142–
153. [ 10.1080/02786826.2020.1829536] [PMID: 33822064] 
25. Beggs CB, Avital EJ. A psychrometric model to assess the 
biological decay of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in aerosols. PeerJ 
2021;9:e11024. [doi:10.7717/peerj.11024] [PMID: 33717712]  
26. Sun S, Li J, Han J. How human thermal plume influences near-
human transport of respiratory droplets and airborne particles: 
a review. Environ Chem Lett 2021; 19:1971-1982. [doi: 
10.1007/s10311-020-01178-4] [PMID: 33495695] 
27. Schuit M, Ratnesar-Shumate S, Yolitz J, et al. Airborne SARS-
CoV-2 is rapidly inactivated by simulated sunlight. J Infect Dis 
2020;222(4):564–571. [doi: 10.1093/infdis/jiaa334] [PMID: 
32525979] 
28. Riley EC, Murphy G, Riley RL. Airborne spread of measles in a 
suburban elementary school. Am J Epidemiol 1978;107(5):421–
432. [doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a112560] [PMID: 665658] 
29. Beggs CB, Noakes CJ, Sleigh PA, et al. The transmission of 
tuberculosis in confined spaces: an analytical review of 
alternative epidemiological models. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis 
2003;7(11):1015–1026. [PMID: 14598959] 
30. Beggs CB, Shepherd SJ, Kerr KG. Potential for airborne 
transmission of infection in the waiting areas of healthcare 
premises: stochastic analysis using a Monte Carlo model. BMC 
Infect Dis 2010; 10:247. [doi: 10.1186/1471-2334-10-247] [PMID: 
20727178] 
31. Rudnick SN, Milton DK. Risk of indoor airborne infection 
transmission estimated from carbon dioxide concentration. 
Indoor Air 2003;13(3):237–245. [doi: 10.1034/j.1600-
0668.2003.00189.x] [PMID: 12950586] 
32. van Doremalen N, Bushmaker T, Morris DH, et al. Aerosol and 
surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 as compared with SARS-CoV-1. 
                                                                                                                                             REVIEW                                                                                                                           
 
                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                      
  SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021       14 
 
N Engl J Med 2020;382(16):1564–1567.  
[doi: 10.1056/NEJMc2004973] [PMID: 32182409] 
33. Chin AWH, Chu JTS, Perera MRA, et al. Stability of SARS-CoV-
2 in different environmental conditions. Lancet Microbe 
2020;1(1):e10. [doi: 10.1016/S2666-5247(20)30003-3] [PMID: 
32835322] 
34. Edwards T, Kay GA, Aljayyoussi G, et al. SARS-CoV-2 
Transmission risk from sports equipment (STRIKE). medRxiv 
preprints 2021 [doi: 10.1101/2021.02.04.21251127] 
35. Pelisser M, Thompson J, Majra D, et al. Sports balls as potential 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission vectors. Public Health Pract 
2020;1:100029. [doi: 10.1016/j.puhip.2020.100029] [PMID: 
34173569] 
36. Ong SW, Tan YK, Chia PY, et al. Air, surface environmental, and 
personal protective equipment contamination by Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a 
symptomatic patient. JAMA 2020;323(16):1610–1612. [doi: 
10.1001/jama.2020.3227] [PMID: 32129805] 
37. Salido RA, Morgan SC, Rojas MI, et al. Handwashing and 
detergent treatment greatly reduce SARS-CoV-2 viral load on 
Halloween candy handled by COVID-19 patients. mSystems 
2020;5(6):e01074-01020. [doi: 10.1128/mSystems.01074-20] 
[PMID: 33127739] 
38. Ben-Shmuel A, Brosh-Nissimov T, Glinert I, et al. Detection and 
infectivity potential of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) environmental contamination in 
isolation units and quarantine facilities. Clin Microbiol Infect 
2020;26(12):1658–1662. [doi: 10.1016/j.cmi.2020.09.004] [PMID: 
32919072]   
39. Goldman E. Exaggerated risk of transmission of COVID-19 by 
fomites. Lancet Infect Dis 2020;20(8):892–893. [doi: 
10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30561-2] [PMID: 32628907]   
40. Cevik M, Kuppalli K, Kindrachuk J, et al. Virology, transmission, 
and pathogenesis of SARS-CoV-2. BMJ 2020;371:m3862. [doi: 
10.1136/bmj.m3862] [PMID: 33097561]   
41. Byrne RL, Kay GA, Kontogianni K, et al. Saliva alternative to 
upper respiratory swabs for SARS-CoV-2 diagnosis. Emerg 
Infect Dis 2020;26(11):2769-2770. [doi: 10.3201/eid2611.203283] 
[PMID: 32917294] 
42. Harbourt DE, Haddow AD, Piper AE, et al. Modeling the 
stability of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) on skin, currency, and clothing. PLoS Negl Trop 
Dis 2020;14(11):e0008831. [doi: 10.1371/journal.pntd.0008831] 
[PMID: 33166294]   
43. Wilson AM, Weir MH, Bloomfield SF, et al. Modelling COVID-
19 infection risks for a single hand-to-fomite scenario and 
potential risk reductions offered by surface disinfection. Am J 
Infect Control 2020;49(6):846-848. [doi: 10.1016/j.ajic.2020.11.013] 
[PMID: 33207258] 
44. Bibby K, Peccia J. Identification of viral pathogen diversity in 
sewage sludge by metagenome analysis. Environ Sci Technol 
2013;47(4):1945-1951. [doi:. 10.1021/es305181x] [PMID: 23346855] 
45. Cantalupo PG, Calgua B, Zhao G, et al. Raw sewage harbors 
diverse viral populations. mBio 2011;2(5):e00180-001811. [doi: 
10.1128/mBio.00180-11] [PMID: 21972239] 
46. Gall AM, Mariñas BJ, Lu Y, et al. Waterborne viruses: A barrier 
to safe drinking water. PLOS Pathog 2015;11(6):e1004867. [doi: 
10.1371/journal.ppat.1004867] [PMID: 26110535]   
47. Guerrero-Latorre L, Ballesteros I, Villacrés-Granda I, et al. SARS-
CoV-2 in river water: Implications in low sanitation countries. 
Sci Total Environ 2020;743:140832.  
[doi: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140832] [PMID: 32679506]   
48. Haramoto E, Malla B, Thakali O, et al. First environmental 
surveillance for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater 
and river water in Japan. Sci Total Environ 2020;737:140405. 
[doi:org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140405] [PMID: 32783878]   
49. Rimoldi SG, Stefani F, Gigantiello A, et al. Presence and 
infectivity of SARS-CoV-2 virus in wastewaters and rivers. Sci 
Total Environ 2020;744:140911.  
[doi: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140911] [PMID: 32693284]   
50. Gundy PM, Gerba CP, Pepper IL. Survival of coronaviruses in 
water and wastewater. Food Environ Virol 2009;1(1):10. [doi: 
10.1007/s12560-008-9001-6] 
51. Tran HN, Le GT, Nguyen DT, et al. SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus in 
water and wastewater: A critical review about presence and 
concern. Environ Res 2021;193:110265. [doi: 
10.1016/j.envres.2020.110265] [PMID: 33011225]   
52. Sherchan SP, Shahin S, Ward LM, et al. First detection of SARS-
CoV-2 RNA in wastewater in North America: A study in 
Louisiana, USA. Sci Total Environ 2020;743:140621. [doi: 
10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140621] [PMID: 32758821] 
53. Wigginton KR, Ye Y, Ellenberg RM. Emerging investigators 
series: the source and fate of pandemic viruses in the urban 
water cycle. Environ Sci Water Res Technol 2015;1(6):735–746. 
[doi: 10.1039/C5EW00125K]   
54. Pinon A, Vialette M. Survival of viruses in water. Intervirology 
2018;61(5):214–222. [doi: 10.1159/000484899] [PMID: 29316545]     
55. Esakandari H, Nabi-Afjadi M, Fakkari-Afjadi J, et al. A 
comprehensive review of COVID-19 characteristics. Biol Proced 
Online 2020;22:19. [doi: 10.1186/s12575-202-00129-2] [PMID: 
32774178]     
56. Saw AE, Main LC, Gastin PB. Monitoring the athlete training 
response: subjective self-reported measures trump commonly 
used objective measures: a systematic review. Br J Sports Med 
2016;50(5):281-291. [doi:org/10.1136/bjsports-2015-094758] 
[PMID: 26423706] 
57. Wright WF, Mackowiak PA. Why temperature screening for 
coronavirus disease 2019 with noncontact infrared 
thermometers does not work. Open Forum Infect Dis 
2020;8(1):ofaa603. [doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofaa603] [PMID: 33506067]  
58. Lee S, Meyler P, Mozel M, et al. Asymptomatic carriage and 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2: What do we know? Can J Anaesth 
2020;67(10):1424-1430. [doi: 10.1007/s12630-020-01729-x] [PMID: 
32488493] 
59. Wang X, Yao H, Xu X, et al. Limits of detection of 6 approved 
RT–PCR kits for the novel SARS-Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). 
Clin Chem 2020;66(7):977–979. [doi: 10.1093/clinchem/hvaa009] 
[PMID: 32282874] 
60. Arnaout R, Lee RA, Lee GR, et al. SARS-CoV2 testing: The limit 
of detection matters. bioRxiv 2020;6(2):131144. [doi: 
10.1101/2020.06.02.121144] [PMID: 32577640] 
61. La Scola B, Le Bideau M, Andreani J, et al. Viral RNA load as 
determined by cell culture as a management tool for discharge 
of SARS-CoV-2 patients from infectious disease wards. Eur J 
Clin Microbiol Infect Dis 2020;39(6):1059–1061. [doi: 
10.107/s10096-020-03913-9] [PMID: 32342252] 
62. Marot S, Calvez V, Louet M, et al. Interpretation of SARS-CoV-2 
replication according to RT-PCR crossing threshold value. Clin 
Microbiol Infect 2021;27(7) 1056-1057. [doi: 
10.1016/j.cmi.2021.01.017] [PMID: 33524586] 
63. Coyle PV, Molawi NH, Kacem MA, et al. Inclusion of cycle 
threshold (CT) values when reporting SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR 
results improves clinical interpretation in suspected and 
confirmed COVID-19. medRxiv 2021.02.11.21251557 [doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.02.11.21251557] 
64. Watson J, Whiting PF, Brush JE. Interpreting a covid-19 test 
result. BMJ 2020;369:m1808. [https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1808] 
[PMID: 32398230] 
65. Arevalo-Rodriguez I, Buitrago-Garcia D, Simancas-Racines D, et 
al. False-negative results of initial RT-PCR assays for COVID-19: 
 REVIEW                                                                                                                                                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
15    SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021 
 
A systematic review. PloS One 2020;15(12):e0242958. [doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0242958] [PMID: 33301459] 
66. Tsang NN, So HC, Ng KY, et al. Diagnostic performance of 
different sampling approaches for SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR testing: 
a systematic review and meta-analysis. Lancet Infect Dis 2021. 
[doiorg/10.1016/S1473-3099(21)00146-8] [PMID: 33857405] 
67. Skittrall JP, Wilson M, Smielewska AA, et al. Specificity and 
positive predictive value of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid 
amplification testing in a low-prevalence setting. Clin Microbiol 
Infect 2021;27(3):469.e9-469.e15. [doi: 10.1016/j.cmi.2020.10.003] 
[PMID: 33068757] 
68. Zalzala HH. Diagnosis of COVID-19: facts and challenges. New 
Microbes New Infect 2020;38:100761. 
 [doi: 10.1016/j.nmni.2020.100761] [PMID: 32953123] 
69. FIND. FIND evaluation of SARS-CoV-2 antigen (Ag) detecting 
tests. finddx.org/sarscov2-eval-antigen/ (Accessed 1st April 2021) 
70. Torjesen I. Covid-19: How the UK is using lateral flow tests in 
the pandemic. BMJ 2021;372:n287. [doi: 10.1136/bmj.n287] 
[PMID: 33541908] 
71. Iacobucci G. Covid-19: Rapid test missed over 50% of positive 
cases in Manchester pilot. BMJ 2020;371:m4323. 
[https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m4323] [PMID: 33158908] 
72. Yahav D, Yelin D, Eckerle I, et al. Definitions for coronavirus 
disease 2019 reinfection, relapse and PCR re-positivity. Clin 
Microbiol Infect 2021;27(3):315-318. 
[doi:org/10.1016/j.cmi.2020.11.028] [PMID: 33285276] 
73. Iwasaki A. What reinfections mean for COVID-19. Lancet Infect 
Dis 2021;21(1):3–5. [doi: 10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30783-0] [PMID: 
33058796] 
74. Hull JH, Schwellnus MP, Pyne DB, et al. COVID-19 vaccination 
in athletes: ready, set, go…. Lancet Respir Med 2021;9(5):455–
456. [ doi: 10.1016/S2213-2600(21)00082-5] [PMID: 33556316] 
75. Livingston EH. Necessity of 2 doses of the Pfizer and Moderna 
COVID-19 vaccines. JAMA 2021 Mar 2;325(9):898. [doi: 
10.1001/jama.2021.1375] [PMID: 33533893] 
76. Polack FP, Thomas SJ, Kitchin N, et al. Safety and efficacy of the 
BNT162b2 mRNA Covid-19 vaccine. N Engl J Med 
2020;383(27):2603-2615. [doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa2034577] [PMID: 
33301246] 
77. Levine-Tiefenbrun M, Yelin I, Katz R, et al. Initial report of 
decreased SARS-CoV-2 viral load after inoculation with the 
BNT162b2 vaccine. Nat Med 2021;27(5):790–792 [doi: 
10.1038/s41591-021-01316-7] [PMID: 33782619] 
78. Creech CB, Walker SC, Samuels RJ. SARS-CoV-2 vaccines. 
JAMA 2021;325(13):1318-1320. [doi: 10.1001/jama.2021.3199] 
[PMID: 33635317] 
79. Bleier BS, Ramanathan M, Lane AP. COVID-19 vaccines may not 
prevent nasal SARS-CoV-2 infection and asymptomatic 
transmission. Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg 2021;164(2):305-307. 
[doi: 10.1177/0194599820982633] [PMID: 33320052] 
80. Jones B, Phillips G, Kemp S, et al. COVID-19 in professional 
rugby: A reflection of prevalence in the community. BJSM blog. 
[https://blogs.bmj.com/bjsm/2021/02/20/covid-19-in-
professional-rugby-a-reflection-of-prevalence-in-the-
community/] (Accessed 28 February 2021) 
81. Romanick-Schmiedl S, Raghu G. Telemedicine — maintaining 
quality during times of transition. Nat Rev Dis Primers 
2020;6(1):45. [doi: 10.1038/s41572-020-0185-x.10.1038/s41572-
020-0185-x] [PMID: 32483168] 
82. England. NHS. Standard operating procedure (SOP) for general 
practice in the context of coronavirus (COVID-19). 
[england.nhs.uk/coronavirus/publication/managing-
coronavirus-covid-19-in-general-practice-sop.  (accessed 1st 
April 2021) 
83. Ravindra A, Cuff A, Bernstein IA, et al. Musculoskeletal risk 
stratification tool to inform a discussion about face-to-face 
assessment during the COVID-19 pandemic. BMJ Open Sport 
Exerc Med 2020;6(1):e000916. [doi: 10.1136/bmjsem-2020-000916] 
[PMID: 33033623]  
84. Hodgson L, Phillips G, Gordon J, et al. Interassociation 
consensus recommendations for pitch-side emergency care and 
personal protective equipment for elite sport during the COVID-
19 pandemic. Br J Sports Med 2020;55(10): 531-538. [doi: 
10.1136/bjsports-2020-103226] [PMID: 33361278] 
85. Hodgson L, Phillips G, Saggers RT, et al. Medical care and first 
aid: an interassociation consensus framework for organised non-
elite sport during the COVID-19 pandemic. Br J Sports Med 
2021;bjsports-2020-103622. [doi: 10.1136/bjsports-2020-103622] 
[PMID: 33619127] 
86. Resuscitation Council UK. Resuscitation Council UK Statement 
on COVID-19, CPR and resuscitation in first aid and community 
settings. [https://www.resus.org.uk/covid-19-resources/covid-
19-resources-general-public/resuscitation-council-uk-
statement-covid-19] . (Accessed 27 February 2021) 
87. Atkins DL, Everson-Stewart S, Sears GK, et al. Epidemiology 
and outcomes from out-of-hospital cardiac arrest in children: the 
Resuscitation Outcomes Consortium Epistry-Cardiac Arrest. 
Circulation 2009;119(11):1484–1491. [doi 
10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.108.802678] [PMID: 19273724] 
88. Jones, B, Phillips G, Beggs CB, et al. Team Sport Risk Exposure 
Framework-2 (TS-REF-2) to identify sports activities and 
contacts at increased SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Br J Sports Med 2021; 0: 1-2. [doi: 
10.1136/bjsports-2021-104225] [PMID: 34187786] 
89. Egger F, Faude O, Schreiber S, et al. Does playing football 
(soccer) lead to SARS-CoV-2 transmission? A case study of 3 
matches with 18 infected football players. Science and Medicine 
in Football 2021 [doi: 10.1080/24733938.2021.1895442] 
90. Schumacher YO, Tabben M, Hassoun K, et al. Resuming 
professional football (soccer) during the COVID-19 pandemic in 
a country with high infection rates: a prospective cohort study. 
Br J Sports Med 2021;bjsports-2020-103724. [doi: 
10.1136/bjsports-2020-103724] [PMID: 33589470] 
91. Blocken B, van Druenen T, Ricci A, et al. Ventilation and air 
cleaning to limit aerosol particle concentrations in a gym during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Build Environ 2021;193:107659. [doi: 
10.1016/j.buildenv.2021.107659] [PMID: 33568882] 
92. Johnson GR, Morawska L. The mechanism of breath aerosol 
formation. J Aerosol Med Pulm Drug Deliv 2009;22(3):229–237. 
[doi: 10.1089/jamp.2008.0720] [PMID: 19415984] 
93. Bond TC, Bosco-Lauth A, Farmer DK, et al. Quantifying 
proximity, confinement, and interventions in disease outbreaks: 
A decision support framework for air-transported pathogens. 
Environ Sci Technol 2021;55(5):2890–2898. 
[doi 10.1021/acs.est.0c07721] [PMID: 33605140] 
94. McKenna, J, Backhouse, SH, Phillips, et al. Changing player 
behaviour in sport during the COVID-19 pandemic: Shake on it? 
South Afr J Sports Med 2020;32(1):1-2 [doi: 10.17159/2078-
516X/2020/v32i1a8967]  
95. Buonanno G, Stabile L, Morawska L. Estimation of airborne viral 
emission: Quanta emission rate of SARS-CoV-2 for infection risk 
assessment. Environ Int 2020;141:105794. [doi: 
10.1016/j.envint.2020.105794] [PMID: 32416374] 
96. Bahl P, Doolan C, de Silva C, et al. Airborne or droplet 
precautions for health workers treating coronavirus disease 
2019? J Infect Dis 2020;jiaa189. [doi: 10.1093/infdis/jiaa189] 
[PMID: 32301491] 
97. Setti L, Passarini F, De Gennaro G, et al. Airborne transmission 
route of COVID-19: why 2 meters/6 feet of inter-personal 
distance could not be enough. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 
                                                                                                                                             REVIEW                                                                                                                           
 
                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                      
  SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021       16 
 
2020;17(8):2932 [doi: 10.3390/ijerph17082932] [PMID: 32340347] 
98. Kampert M, Singh T, Finet JE, et al. Impact of wearing a facial 
covering on aerobic exercise capacity in the COVID-19 era: Is it 
more than a feeling? Clin Res Cardiol 2020;109(12):1595-1596. 
[doi: 10.1007/s00392-020-01725-7] [PMID: 32833178] 
99. Epstein D, Korytny A, Isenberg Y, et al. Return to training in the 
COVID-19 era: The physiological effects of face masks during 
exercise. Scand J Med Sci Sports 2021;31(1):70–75. [doi: 
10.1111/sms.13832] [PMID: 32969531] 
100. Howard J, Huang A, Li Z, et al. An evidence review of face 
masks against COVID-19. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 
2021;118(4):e2014564118. [doi: 10.1073/pnas.2014564118] [PMID: 
33431650] 
101. Chandrasekaran B, Fernandes S. ’Exercise with facemask; Are 
we handling a devil’s sword?’–A physiological hypothesis. Med 
Hypotheses 2020;144:110002. [doi: 10.1016/j.mehy.2020.110002] 
[PMID: 32590322] 
102. Fathizadeh H, Taghizadeh S, Safari R, et al. Study presence of 
COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) in the sweat of patients infected with 
Covid-19. Microb Pathog 2020;149:104556. [doi: 
10.1016/j.micpath.2020.104556] [PMID: 33031898] 
103. La Rosa G, Bonadonna L, Lucentini L, et al. Coronavirus in water 
environments: Occurrence, persistence and concentration 
methods - A scoping review. Water Res 2020;179:115899. [doi: 
10.1016/j.watres.2020.115899] [PMID: 32361598] 
104. Piana A, Colucci ME, Valeriani F, et al. Monitoring COVID-19 
transmission risks by RT-PCR tracing of droplets in hospital and 
living environments. ASA Journals. mSphere 2021;6(1):e01070-
20. [doi: 10.1128/mSphere.01070-20] [PMID: 33408231] 
105. Romano Spica V, Gallè F, Baldelli G, et al. Swimming pool safety 
and prevention at the time of Covid-19: a consensus document 
from GSMS-SItI. Ann Ig 2020;32(5):439-448. [doi: 
10.7416/ai.2020.2368] [PMID: 32578839] 
106. Wang X-W, Li J-S, Jin M, et al. Study on the resistance of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus. J Virol 
Methods 2005;126(1-2):171-177.  
[doi: 10.1016/j.jviromet.2005.02.005] [PMID: 15847934] 
107. Margarucci LM, Romano Spica V, Gianfranceschi G, et al. 
Untouchability of natural spa waters: Perspectives for 
treatments within a personalized water safety plan. Environ Int 
2019;133(Pt A):105095. [doi: 10.1016/j.envint.2019.105095] 
[PMID: 31518929] 
108. Valeriani F, Crognale S, Protano C, et al. Metagenomic analysis 
of bacterial community in a travertine depositing hot spring. 
New Microbiol 2018;41(2):126-135. [PMID: 29498741] 
109. Valeriani F, Gianfranceschi G, Romano Spica V. The microbiota 
as a candidate biomarker for SPA pools and SPA thermal spring 
stability after seismic events. Environ Int 2020;137:105595. [doi: 
10.1016/j.envint.2020.105595] [PMID: 32106051] 
110. Li J-PO, Lam DSC, Chen Y, et al. Novel Coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19): The importance of recognising possible early 
ocular manifestation and using protective eyewear. Br J 
Ophthalmol 2020;104(3):297-298. [doi: 10.1136/bjophthalmol-
2020-315994] [PMID: 32086236] 
111. Seah I, Agrawal R. Can the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19) affect the eyes? A review of coronaviruses and ocular 
implications in humans and animals. Ocul Immunol Inflamm 
2020;28(3):391-395. [doi: 10.1080/09273948.2020.1738501] [PMID: 
32175797] 
112. Clementi M, Signorelli C, Romano Spica V, et al. Protocols and 
self-checking plans for the safety of post-covid-19 
balneotherapy. Acta Biomed 2020;91(9-S):40-49. [doi: 
10.23750/abm.v91i9-S.10167] [PMID: 32701916] 
113. Gov.UK. Environmental and Modelling Group, Transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 and mitigating measures - update, 4 June 2020. 
[https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transmission-
of-SARS-CoV-2-and-mitigating-measures-update-4-june-2020] 
(Accessed 26 February 2021) 
114. Leung NH, Chu DK, Shiu EY, et al. Respiratory virus shedding 
in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks. Nat Med 
2020;26(5):676-680. [doi: 10.1038/s41591-020-0843-2] [PMID: 
32371934] 
115. Ollila HM, Partinen M, Koskela J, et al. Face masks to prevent 
transmission of respiratory diseases: Systematic review and 
meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials*. medRxiv 
2020.07.31.20166116. [doi:org/10.1101/2020.07.31.20166116]  
116. Milton DK. A rosetta stone for understanding infectious drops 
and aerosols. J Pediatric Infect Dis Soc 2020;9(4):413–415. 
[doi:org/10.1093/jpids/piaa079] [PMID: 32706376] 
117. Jones NR, Qureshi ZU, Temple RJ, et al. Two metres or one: what 
is the evidence for physical distancing in covid-19? BMJ 
2020;370:m3223. [doi: 10.1136/bmj.m3223] [PMID: 32843355] 
118. Riediker M, Tsai D-H. Estimation of viral aerosol emissions from 
simulated individuals with asymptomatic to moderate 
coronavirus disease 2019. JAMA Netw Open 2020;3(7):e2013807. 
[doi 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.13807] [PMID: 32716517] 
119. Yusef D, Hayajneh W, Awad S, et al. Large outbreak of 
coronavirus disease among wedding attendees, Jordan. Emerg 
Infect Dis 2020;26(9):2165-2167. [doi: 10.3201/eid2609.201469] 
[PMID: 32433907] 
120. Prather KA, Wang CC, Schooley RT. Reducing transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2. Science 2020;368(6498):1422-1424. [doi: 
10.1126/science.abc6197] [PMID: 32461212] 
121. Bostock B. 200 000 doomsday church members are being tested 
in South Korea for the coronavirus. 
[https://www.businessinsider.co.za/south-korea-tests-every-
shincheonji-cult-member-coronavirus-outbreak-2020-
2?r=US&IR=T] (Accessed 26 February 2021) 
122. James A, Eagle L, Phillips C, et al. High COVID-19 attack rate 
among attendees at events at a church - Arkansas, March 2020. 
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020;69(20):632-635. [doi: 
10.15585/mmwr.mm6920e2] [PMID: 32437338] 
123. Hamner L, Dubbel P, Capron I, et al. High SARS-CoV-2 attack 
rate following exposure at a choir practice — Skagit County, 
Washington, March 2020. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 
2020;69(19):606-610. [doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6919e6] [PMID: 
32407303] 
124. Burridge HC, Fan S, Jones RL, et al. Predictive and retrospective 
modelling of airborne infection risk using monitored carbon 
dioxide. [https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.02999].  
125. GOV.UK. EMG: Role of ventilation in controlling SARS-CoV-2 
transmission, 30 September 2020. Paper prepared by the 
Environmental Modelling Group (EMG). 
[https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emg-role-of-
ventilation-in-controlling-sars-cov-2-transmission-30-
september-2020]. (Accessed 25 February 2021) 
126. Kriegel M, Buchholz U, Gastmeier P, et al. Predicted infection 
risk for aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2. medRxiv 
2020.10.08.20209106. [doi: 10.1101/2020.10.08.20209106] 
127. Kähler CJ, Fuchs T, Hain R. Können mobile Raumluftreiniger 
eine indirekte SARS-CoV-2 Infektionsgefahr durch Aerosole 
wirksam reduzieren? 2020. [doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27503.46243] 
128. Smither SJ, Eastaugh LS, Findlay JS, et al. Experimental aerosol 
survival of SARS-CoV-2 in artificial saliva and tissue culture 
media at medium and high humidity. Emerg Microbes Infect 
2020;9(1):1415-1417. [doi: 10.1080/22221751.2020.1777906] 
[PMID: 32496967] 
129. GOV.UK. Coronavirus (COVID-19): safer transport guidance for 
operators. 2021.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-
 REVIEW                                                                                                                                                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
17    SAJSM VOL. 33 NO. 1 2021 
 
covid-19-safer-transport-guidance-for-operators/coronavirus-
covid-19-safer-transport-guidance-for-operators. (accessed 26 
February 2021) 
130. Weed M, Foad A. Rapid scoping review of evidence of outdoor 
transmission of COVID-19. medRxiv 2020.09.04.20188417. [doi: 
10.1101/2020.09.04.20188417]  
131. Bouvard O, Burnier L, Oelhafen P, et al. Solar heat gains through 
train windows: a non-negiligible contribution to the energy 
balance. Energy Efficiency 2018;11(6):1397-1410. [doi: 
10.1007/s12053-018-9643-7] 
132. Chow WK. Ventilation of enclosed train compartments in Hong 
Kong. Appl Energy 2002;71(3):161-170. [doi: 10.1016/S0306-
2619(02)00008-9] 
133. Cheng Y-H, Liu Z-S, Yan J-W. Comparisons of PM10, PM2.5, 
particle number, and CO2 levels inside metro trains traveling in 
underground tunnels and on elevated tracks. Aerosol Air Qual 
Res 2012;12(5):879-891. [doi: 10.4209/aaqr.2012.05.0127]  
134. Xu B, Yu X, Gu H, et al. Commuters’ exposure to PM2.5 and CO2 
in metro carriages of Shanghai metro system. Transp Res Part D: 
Transp Environ 2016;47(1):162-170.  
[doi: 10.1016/j.trd.2016.05.001] 
135. Gao Y, Chen F, Wang Z. The distribution and influential factors 
of PM2.5 and CO2 in urban rail carriages. Indoor Built Environ 
2019;28(10):1383-1395.  [doi: 10.1177/1420326X19841109] 
136. Schwartz KL, Murti M, Finkelstein M, et al. Lack of COVID-19 
transmission on an international flight. CMAJ 2020;192(15):E410. 
[doi: 10.1503/cmaj.75015] [PMID: 32392504] 
137. Khanh NC, Thai PQ, Quach H-L, et al. Transmission of SARS-
CoV 2 during long-haul flight. Emerg Infect Dis 
2020;26(11):2617-2624. [doi: 10.3201/eid2611.203299] [PMID: 
32946369] 
138. Beggs CB, Noakes CJ, Shepherd SJ, et al. The influence of nurse 
cohorting on hand hygiene effectiveness. Am J Infect Control 
2006;34(10):621-626. [doi: 10.1016/j.ajic.2006.06.011] [PMID: 
17161736] 
139. Alvarez-Ramirez J, Meraz M. Role of meteorological 
temperature and relative humidity in the January-February 2020 
propagation of 2019-nCoV in Wuhan, China. medRxiv 
2020.03.19.20039164. [doi: 10.1101/2020.03.19.20039164] 
140. GOV.UK. Review: what is the evidence for the importance of 
outdoor transmission and of indoor transmission of COVID-19, 
2 April 2020.  Paper prepared by the Environmental Modelling 
Group (EMG).  
[https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-what-is-
the-evidence-for-the-importance-of-outdoor-transmission-and-
of-indoor-transmission-of-covid-19-2-april-2020] (Accessed 27 
February 2021) 
 
